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Abstract 
The complex mechanisms of heredity are little appreciated by nonspecialists, in some measure, be-
cause of misunderstandings that are perpetuated when words used for technical terms have other, 
more widely understood, folk meanings. When a word has both technical and folk meanings, it is 
the responsibility of the specialist to avoid promoting confusion by either using extremely cautious 
and precise language when using the term or, in cases when confusion is inevitable, abandoning the 
term in favor of one without a widely understood folk meaning. The study of heredity is beset by 
such confusion, and the term heritability appears to be at the heart of some of the confusion. In this 
article, I discuss both the technical and folk meanings of heritability and examine the bridge between 
them. By continuing to use the term heritability, we risk promulgating serious misunderstanding 
about the workings of heredity; therefore, I suggest selectability as an alternative term to avoid such 
pitfalls. 
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Introduction 
 
It is curious that, although the fact of heredity is familiar to everybody from eve-
ryday observation, heredity is one of the most widely and persistently misun-
derstood phenomena of nature. The main source of the misunderstanding is an 
ambiguity of our language . . . (Dobzhansky, 1964, p. 7) 
 
Despite unprecedented progress in the scientific understanding of heredity in the years 
since Dobzhansky penned this eloquent statement, no real progress has been made toward 
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clearing up the misunderstandings that are a direct result of the ambiguities to which he 
referred. Though scientists are largely responsible for such misunderstandings—because 
they have taken words with widely understood folk meanings and used them to describe 
precise mechanisms and quantities that are inconsistent with the more well-known mean-
ings of those words—no serious attempt has been made by them to reduce such ambiguity 
in our language regarding heredity. On the contrary, terms such as “heritability” and its 
derivative “heritable”—which perpetuate a basic misunderstanding of the mechanisms of 
heredity—have become commonplace in the scientific literature. 
Many of the technical terms used by professional geneticists have meanings in the Eng-
lish language other than those they intend, and those nontechnical meanings are rather old 
and widely understood, whereas the technical meanings are rather new and are under-
stood only by specialists. One of the fundamental aspects of heredity that is rarely fully 
understood by nonspecialists has to do with what it is that is actually transmitted from 
parents to offspring. In a genetic sense, only the constituents of the gametes are inherited; 
traits are developed anew in each individual. However, when scientists make statements 
suggesting that a behavior is heritable they perpetuate the misunderstanding that behav-
iors are passed down from parents to offspring much like a baton that is passed from one 
relay runner to the next. The common or folk understanding of heredity is closely tied to 
very old definitions which have more to do with handing down property and/or titles from 
one generation to the next than they do with genetics. 
To better understand the basis of the confusion between folk and technical definitions, 
I examine in this article some terms associated with heredity, but my main focus is on the 
term heritability because of its importance in both technical and popular writings. My pur-
pose is to present an examination of the ways that the word heritability has been used in 
the English language in some detail and to discuss some of the confusions and misunder-
standings that have arisen as a result of heritability’s dual meaning. First, I discuss the 
technical meaning of heritability, including its two definitions, both narrow and broad. 
Second, I discuss some of the common, or folk, meanings of terms associated with heredity, 
including heritability. Third, I address the question “What is inherited?” to explore the 
differences between what the specialists and the nonspecialists understand about heredity. 
Finally, I suggest strategies aimed at reducing the confusion fostered by the contamination 
of the technical usage by the folk usage, including a suggestion for an alternative technical 
term. 
In this article, I do not discuss in detail the pros and cons of making heritability estimates 
for traits in human populations. I leave that argument, based on statistical concerns and 
on certain necessary—often violated—assumptions, to others more qualified than I. My 
main task is to explore some of the issues surrounding the ambiguity of our language with 
respect to heredity. 
 
Technical heritability 
 
Heritability estimates—variance ratios which can range from 0.0 to to 1.0—were first used 
by breeders to predict the effectiveness of artificial selection for particular trait expressions 
in a given population under carefully specified living conditions (e.g., Lush, 1937). For 
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economically important traits, such as milk production in cows, it can be important to have 
some idea of whether a lengthy (therefore costly) program of selective breeding is likely to 
result in the desired selection gains. For a given population under carefully specified con-
ditions, predicting the response to selection for the expression of various traits can be ra-
ther accurately done in the early generations of selection; however, predicting the response 
in later generations often becomes quite difficult (Lerner, 1958). Because an estimate of 
heritability is a property of a population at a specific time and in a specific environment, 
changes in the population’s gene pool (e.g., as a result of selection), or in the environment, 
can change heritability estimates. Whereas heritability estimates can provide some useful 
information for breeders, it has been long recognized that they are but a small piece in an 
exceedingly complex puzzle (Lush, 1937; Lerner, 1958). 
The technical term heritability refers to a specific statistic for estimating the proportion 
of trait variance that is accounted for (in a statistical sense) by genetic factors (but see 
Lewontin, 1974). However, the language that surrounds the partitioning of variance is 
prone to misunderstanding in its own right (Lewontin, 1974; Kempthorne, 1978); therefore, 
I avoid using terms such as “due to” or “caused by” when referring to the statistical rela-
tions between an independent variable and a dependent variable (e.g., in an analysis of 
variance [ANOVA]) but instead use terms such as “associated with” to avoid deterministic 
implications. 
Of course, animal breeders were not alone in their interest in heritability estimates. In 
the first part of the century, theoretically oriented quantitative geneticists were in the early 
stages of developing their science and some found that heritability estimates filled an im-
portant niche in their models of the relation between heredity and quantitative traits. 
Wright was especially important in the development of the ideas surrounding heritability 
estimates; in fact, he made use of the concept in his early work on coat color in guinea pigs 
(Wright, 1920), although it was not explicitly named until 1940 by Lush (Lush, 1940; see 
Bell, 1977). Other quantitative geneticists, however, were not enamored by heritability es-
timation. In fact, Fisher once described it as “one of those unfortunate short-cuts which 
have emerged from biometry for lack of a more thorough analysis of the data” (Fisher, 
1951, cited in Wahlsten, 1994b). 
Since the birth of the discipline of behavior-genetic analysis in the late 1950s, researchers 
have often applied the statistical approaches developed by animal breeders and quantita-
tive geneticists, specifically heritability estimation, in efforts to understand the relations 
between heredity and perhaps the most complex phenotype, behavior. In an early review 
of the field of behavior-genetic analysis, McClearn (1962) states that “one of the central 
concepts of genetics is that of heritability” (p. 234, his emphasis). Curiously, McClearn 
(1962) did not frequently use the term heritabitity; however, he did refer to the concept 
fairly regularly: “weighing the relative effects of nature and nurture” (p. 196), “relative 
contributions of heredity and environment” (p. 206), and “relative influences of genetic 
differences and environmental differences in determining the individual variability in phe-
notypes” (p. 210). Clearly, by the early 1960s heritability estimates had gained a strong 
foothold in the study of heredity-behavior relations; however, not all behavior-geneticists 
agreed that they were a “central concept” of the field (e.g., Hirsch, 1967, p. 423). 
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Heritability estimates are now firmly entrenched in the field of behavior genetics, although 
there are differing opinions regarding their utility in research with human subjects (e.g., 
McGuire & Hirsch, 1977; Kempthorne, 1978; Plomin et al., 1990; Tesser, 1993; Wahlsten, 
1994a). In behavior-genetic analysis, heritability estimates are one of the most frequently 
calculated statistics when humans are the research subjects, whereas they are less fre-
quently calculated when animals are. Of the 98 articles published in volumes 24 and 25 
(1994 & 1995) in the journal Behavior Genetics (excluding abstracts, book reviews, etc.) 33% 
(32) reported heritability estimates. Of those articles reporting heritability estimates, 87.5% 
(28) used human subjects, while the remaining 12.5% (4) used animal subjects. There is a 
clear bias in favor of calculating heritability estimates when the research subjects are human. 
It is rather disconcerting that heritability estimation is more common in human than in 
animal behavior-genetic analysis for two main reasons. First, the primary use of heritabil-
ity estimates is to predict or to assess the results of selective breeding, which is obviously 
proscribed in human populations. Second, human populations are much more unlikely to 
satisfy the host of assumptions that undergird partitioning behavioral variance into the 
P = G + E model. Such assumptions include no dominance deviation, no epistasis, no as-
sortative mating, no genotype × environment (G × E) interaction, and no GE covariance 
(Falconer, 1989). Most or all of these assumptions are unlikely to be met in human popula-
tions (McGuire & Hirsch, 1977). 
Of course, it is a common practice to include such effects in the model being tested and 
drop those terms that fail to reach a predetermined significance criterion. In such a situa-
tion, one needs to consider the statistical power of the comparison in question. Wahlsten’s 
(1990) discussion of the power of the ANOVA model to detect heredity-environment in-
teractions is a wake-up call for all researchers who routinely use ANOVAs to carefully 
consider power questions when designing and trying to interpret the results of experi-
ments. Regardless of the model being tested, dropping terms that do not reach statistical 
significance does not change the biological system being studied. 
J. L. Lush is generally credited with being the first to use the term heritability in a tech-
nical sense, although others—in particular, some plant breeders—had begun using it more 
loosely somewhat earlier (Bell, 1977). Building on the ideas of Johannsen, Wright, and 
Fisher, Lush was the first to precisely define heritability as “the fraction of the observed 
variance which was caused by differences in heredity” (Lush, 1940, p. 293). Recently, 
Plomin et al. (1994) defined heritability as “the proportion of phenotypic variance in a pop-
ulation that can be attributed to genetic influences” (p. 1734). Clearly, the technical defini-
tion of heritability has remained essentially unchanged for more than half a century. 
It is almost certain that Lush (1940, p. 295) coined the terms narrow and broad sense her-
itabilities: “The difference between narrow and broad definitions . . . consists in whether 
the epistatic and dominance deviations are considered.” Narrow heritabilities, on the one 
hand, are those of most interest to the selective breeder in that they measure the extent to 
which, in a given population in a specific environment, variance in the trait of interest is 
associated with additive genetic (i.e., allelic) variance—that which is transmissible from 
parents to offspring. Narrow heritabilities therefore provide a way to predict whether se-
lective breeding for that trait in that population will be successful (Falconer, 1989). Broad 
heritabilities, on the other hand, estimate the extent to which variance in the trait of interest 
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is associated with the genotype—including dominance deviation and interaction variance—
for a given trait in a population raised in a specific environment. Broad heritability esti-
mates are of little interest to the geneticist because they can provide only upper limits to 
estimates of transmissible genetic variance (i.e., narrow heritability). By including domi-
nance deviation and interaction variance—which are frustratingly difficult to measure 
even in well-controlled experiments—estimates of the trait variance due to transmissible 
genetic variance are biased to an unknown degree. Narrow and broad heritability esti-
mates are the same only when dominance deviation and interaction variance are absent 
(Falconer, 1989). It is not uncommon for the assumptions of no dominance deviation and 
no interaction variance to be made, however, but is quite unlikely that such a simple (ad-
ditive) relation exists between complex human behaviors and heredity (e.g., Wahlsten, 
1994a). 
While it has long been known that statistical interactions can be eliminated by scale 
transformations (e.g., Lerner, 1958; Falconer, 1989), such manipulations do not alter the 
nature of biological interactions that occur throughout ontogeny but can obscure perhaps 
the most important and interesting aspects of development. The complexities inherent in 
development are becoming better understood, and nowhere else can this progress be better 
seen than in the fruit fly (see Lawrence, 1992 for a review); however, much still remains to 
be learned. When such in-depth (experimental) studies are performed, the nonlinear na-
ture of development is revealed. Simplistic, linear models do not do justice to the won-
drous complexity of ontogeny. 
The distinction between narrow (h2) and broad (H2) heritability estimates is crucial but 
is often ignored or unappreciated by psychologists (McGuire & Hirsch, 1977). Narrow her-
itability estimates are key in predicting or assessing the effectiveness of artificial selection 
in that they provide a way to gauge the extent to which variance in transmissable genetic 
factors is related to phenotypic variance in a given population. Therefore, h2 estimates are 
of interest in terms of parent-offspring resemblance. Broad heritability estimates assess the 
extent to which genotypic variance is related to phenotypic variance in a given population. 
It is important to stress that H2 estimates include transmissable genetic variation in addi-
tion to variation that results from sources idiosyncratic to the genotypes present in the 
population and the environments to which the population is exposed. Intra- (dominance) 
and inter- (epistasis) locular interactions and heredity-environment interactions are all in-
cluded as genotypic variance in broad heritability estimates. Narrow and broad heritabil-
ity estimates are very different creatures and are by no means interchangeable. 
The two approaches that are most commonly used to make heritability estimates for 
traits in human populations are twin and adoption studies (Plomin et al., 1990). In general, 
with twin studies one can estimate H2, whereas with adoption studies it is possible to es-
timate h2 (Falconer, 1989). It is clearly inappropriate to compare h2 with H2 directly be-
cause they estimate different quantities, however, such comparisons are not uncommon. 
In fact, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the author is referring to h2 or H2 
because both estimates are referred to as heritability and are often represented by h2. For 
example, Emde et al. (1992) estimated “heritability (h2),” by “doubling the between MZ 
(monozygotic) and DZ (dizygotic) correlations” (p. 1445). Because this method is used to 
calculate broad heritability (Plomin et al., 1990, p. 320–322) it is inappropriate to label the 
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quantity h2. When h2 and H2 estimates are referred to interchangeably it becomes difficult 
to critically assess the analyses and subsequent discussion presented. 
Heritability estimates have been successfully used by animal and plant breeders to pre-
dict the response to artificial selection (Lerner, 1958), however, h2 estimates have more 
recently given way to multivariate statistical techniques that can incorporate more real-life 
biological complexity into the models (Arnold, 1994). It is ironic that heritability estimates 
are made most often in behavior-genetic research using human subjects, where the only 
real application of h2 estimates—selective breeding—is prohibited. 
 
Folk heritability 
 
The word heritability has another distinct meaning in the English language, not wholly un-
related to the technical meaning but in no way interchangeable with it. Heritability is de-
fined as “the quality of being heritable, or capable of being inherited” (OED2). 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED2) provides three references of some of the early 
uses of heritability that span the greater part of the nineteenth century. The first is in Fra-
ser’s Magazine (1832): “This tax, thus securing the heritability of offices, was not perpetual.” 
The second is in the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts (1882) by noted naturalist 
Asa Gray: “The importance of heritability, which is an essential part of Darwinism, would 
seem to have had a significant illustration in the person of its great expounder.” The third 
is in Advance (1890): “Did you ever think about the heritability of such qualities?” In each 
case, it is obvious that heritability is used as a synonym for “inheritance.” Clearly, prior to 
the advent of the technical definition (ca. 1940), heritability was widely understood to 
mean “capable of being inherited.” Used in this way, if some thing is to be inherited, that 
thing is to be passed from one to another. In a legal sense, such an interpretation is com-
pletely justifiable. However, in a genetic sense such an interpretation does not take into 
account the complexities of heredity and development which make the folk definition of 
heritability misleading when the technical definition of the word is intended. 
 
What is inherited? 
 
Perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of biological inheritance concerns what it is that 
is actually transmitted from parents to offspring. In the strictest genetic sense, it is inap-
propriate to speak of traits or characteristics being inherited; only the constituents of the 
gametes are passed from one generation to the next. The mechanisms of meiosis and de-
velopment preclude the transmission of traits across generations; unique genotypes are 
formed at fertilization which then develop through interactions with idiosyncratic envi-
ronments to form individuals. It is beyond question that for some traits offspring do re-
semble their parents and that those traits were influenced by the parents’ genetic 
contribution. It is not appropriate, however, to say that those traits are inherited. Traits are 
not transmitted from parents to offspring, only the constituents of the gametes are; all else 
is development (see King, 1981). 
Few nonspecialists recognize the distinction between the technical and folk definitions 
of the terms surrounding heredity. Generally, folk definitions lack the precision necessary 
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for good technical definitions and are therefore broader in scope. The two main folk defi-
nitions of the word “inherit” should serve as excellent examples of the ways in which such 
definitions can differ from technical ones, while at the same time hinting at, albeit falling 
short of, the technical meaning. 
First, perhaps the most common folk definition of inherit refers primarily to legal mat-
ters: 
 
To take or receive (property, esp. real property, or a right, privilege, rank or title) 
as the heir of the former possessor (usually an ancestor) at his decease; to get, or 
come into possession of, by legal descent or succession (OED2). 
 
Clearly, under this definition items are passed from one person to another, more or less 
intact (ignoring inheritance taxes for the sake of discussion). The eldest son was the usual 
recipient of such items. This particular meaning of inherit is quite old, being part of the 
English language since at least the fifteenth century and is very weakly linked with the 
technical (biological) understanding of inherit, in that something is passed down from one 
generation to the next. 
Second, the folk definition of inherit, that is perhaps the next most common, is closer to 
the technical (i.e., genetic) definition; however, they are far from isomorphic. 
 
To derive (a quality or character, physical or mental) from one’s progenitors by 
natural descent; to derive or possess by transmission from parents or ancestry 
(OED2). 
 
Many of us have heard it said that “she has her mother’s nose,” or “he got his bad tem-
per from his father’s side of the family,” or something to that effect. Perhaps it is from this 
general understanding of “natural descent” that our current technical understanding of 
heredity is derived. This particular definition of inherit has been a part of the English lan-
guage since at least the sixteenth century, long before the mechanisms of heredity were 
understood in even a rudimentary way. Shakespeare (1601) used this form of inherit in All’s 
Well That Ends Well I. ii. 22: “Youth, thou bear’st thy Fathers face, . . Thy Fathers morall 
parts Maist thou inherit too” (OED2). 
It is important to note that in both of these folk definitions of inherit, those things that 
are passed from one person to another remain essentially intact. Whether one is referring 
to land or to a bad temper, to inherit is to receive something that is whole. This quality of 
passing down an item or a trait intact is an important distinction between the folk and the 
technical definitions of inherit. 
To a geneticist, the only material that is inherited—transmitted from parents to off-
spring—consists of the constituents of the sperm cell from the father and of the egg cell 
(along with various proteins) from the mother. Only these cellular components are inher-
ited in a strict genetic sense. The traits themselves are not passed down but are developed 
anew in each individual as a result of a complex (idiosyncratic) series of interactions be-
tween biological material (e.g., genes, RNA, proteins) and the unique environment in 
which that individual is raised. 
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The cellular processes that result in sex cell formation, called gameteogenesis, are col-
lectively known as meiosis. Understanding these processes is essential for a proper under-
standing of the relations between heredity and behavior because in them lie the key 
mechanisms of Mendelian genetics. However, psychologists have been slow to recognize 
the important role that meiosis plays in the generation of individual differences (Hirsch, 
1963). 
In the early stages of meiosis, homologous chromosomes pair up. While thus paired, 
homologues may exchange material, a process known as crossing over or recombination. 
Such recombination is the foundation for the multitude of linear mapping studies that have 
been and are currently being carried out by geneticists. More importantly, in the context 
of understanding “What is inherited?” recombination is a crucial step in generating geno-
typic uniqueness. The newly produced (recombined) chromosomes are then packaged into 
gametes (sperm or egg), so that each gamete contains 23 chromosomes. Which of the two 
chromosomes from a given pair that is packaged into a sperm (or egg) is independent of 
that same process in any other pair, a process known as independent assortment. Recom-
bination and independent assortment, which have been appreciated only in this century, 
are so effective in producing diversity that it is statistically unlikely that two unrelated 
individuals will have the same genotype (Hirsch, 1963). More to the point, these mecha-
nisms effectively shuffle genetic material so that a parent does not pass their genotype 
(entire genetic complement) to the next generation. Of course a parent does transmit ge-
netic material to their offspring, but it is combined with genetic material from their mate 
to form unique genotypes at conception. By its nature, such biological inheritance is incon-
sistent with the folk notion of inheritance implied by sayings such as “she has her mother’s 
nose.” 
 
Heritable 
 
When a heritability coefficient for a trait (let’s say trait X) in a population is significantly 
different from zero, it is sometimes said that, “trait X is heritable.” While such a transition 
is only a harmless “shorthand” from one perspective, it is a reckless leap from another. In 
fact, it appears that this transition from nonzero heritability coefficients for a particular 
trait in a specific population to the statement that the trait is heritable is the crux of the 
confusion surrounding the use of the term heritability. The word heritable bridges the gap 
between a precisely defined technical term and a loosely defined yet widely understood 
folk term. As just described, the folk and technical meanings of heritability are very differ-
ent but are easily confused. In addition, nonspecialists, unfamiliar with the technical mean-
ing of heritability, understandably resort to the folk definition when confronted with the 
term. Use of the word heritable by specialists reinforces the interpretation of heritability in 
a folk sense because whereas heritable has a well-known folk definition, it has no technical 
definition. 
I have been unable to locate a definition of heritable in the technical literature, though 
the term is used rather liberally. Often, in the introductory section of an article, the word 
heritable is used to discuss research findings, for example, “alcoholism has been assumed 
to be highly heritable” and “autism appears to be among the most heritable psychiatric 
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disorders” (Plomin et al., 1994; p. 1734). In this particular article, the word heritable was not 
defined, and in fact, its use preceded the technical term heritability (which was defined), a 
situation that is not uncommon. The reader can only assume that since heritable is unde-
fined and precedes the technical definition of heritability, the writer intends the common 
or folk meaning of heritable, “naturally transmissible or transmitted from parent to off-
spring; hereditary” (OED2). Such a definition is quite far from the technical definition of 
heritability in that it refers to the trait itself, not to variation in the expression of that trait 
in a population. This may appear to be a trivial difference, a quibble, but confusion over 
the distinction between the inheritance of traits in individuals and of variation in that trait 
in a population is a fundamental misunderstanding of the mechanisms of heredity and of 
the theoretical basis of heritability estimates. 
It is not difficult to find the terms heritable or heritability in both scientific and popular 
publications. Recently, the American Psychologist published a “Report of a Task Force Es-
tablished by the American Psychological Association” titled “Intelligence: Knowns and 
Unknowns” (Neisser, et al., 1996) which was the “authoritative report” on such issues in-
spired by the controversy that followed publication of The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Mur-
ray, 1994). The task force was chosen “with the aim of representing a broad range of 
expertise and opinion” (p. 77). The resulting report can thus be considered the state of the 
art concerning intelligence. Unfortunately, with respect to associations between genetic 
factors and intelligence in humans, the art is rather underdeveloped. In the attempt to dis-
pel one myth about heritability estimates, the report fosters another that is perhaps more 
damaging to understanding the nature of heredity: 
 
A common error is to assume that because something is heritable it is necessarily 
unchangeable. This is wrong. Heritability does not imply immutability. As pre-
viously noted, heritable traits can depend on learning, and they may be subject to 
environmental effects as well (p. 86, my emphasis). 
 
The point being made is a good one: significant heritability estimates for a trait in a 
population do not mean that the trait cannot respond to environmental manipulation. One 
common misunderstanding is that whenever a trait is said to be “genetic” that it is hope-
lessly fixed; a notion that is clearly wrong. However, by using the term heritable—which is 
undefined technically but has a widely understood folk definition (capable of being inher-
ited, hereditary)—the authors of this report are perpetuating the misunderstanding that 
traits are inherited. 
It is particularly noteworthy that many of those who specialize in the study of heredity-
behavior relations also promulgate the mistaken notion that behaviors are inherited. 
McClearn’s (1962) oft-cited review of the history of behavior-genetic analysis, before its 
coming to age as a discrete area of study, is titled “The inheritance of behavior” (my empha-
sis). The masthead of Behavior Genetics, the journal of the Behavior Genetics Association, 
proclaims it to be “An international journal devoted to research in the inheritance of behavior 
in animals and man” (my emphasis). When such a misunderstanding of the fundamental 
mechanisms of genetics is advanced by the scientific establishment, it is little wonder that 
it is widespread in the popular literature. 
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Selectability 
 
Apparently it does little good to warn against over simplifying the idea of herit-
ability. Some feel it necessary to repeat those warnings each time they write. Oth-
ers ignore the warnings. Much of the bulk of that which has been written in recent 
years about heritability in man comes from this. . . . Perhaps this is a basic argu-
ment for coining a new word . . . (Lush, cited in Bell, 1977, p. 299, his emphasis). 
 
To this point, I have outlined one of the main problems with the use of the term herita-
bility by specialists: the folk meaning of the word is generally understood when the tech-
nical meaning is intended. The folk meaning of heritability has a much longer history in 
the English language than does its technical meaning and is much more widely used. The 
confusion between the folk and technical meanings of heritability is further fostered by the 
transition made by researchers from statistically significant, nonzero heritability coeffi-
cients for a trait in a population to claiming the trait itself to be heritable. The term heritable 
has no generally accepted technical definition, though it does have a well-understood folk 
meaning (i.e., hereditary). Thus, the ambiguity in the English language surrounding the 
term heritability has seriously compromised its utility as a meaningful genetic statistic. 
What can and should be done to clear up such confusion? 
There are two courses of action that I suggest; I am sure that, in addition to these, there 
are still others. Neither of these approaches is above criticism, in fact, any solution will 
assuredly have both proponents and opponents. It is my intention to stimulate thought 
and discussion about these matters, not to provide a final word on the matter in these pages. 
A step that would be, at the same time, relatively painless and rather effective in reduc-
ing some of the confusion surrounding heritability is for researchers to avoid using the 
“shorthand” whereby traits with statistically significant heritability coefficients are re-
ferred to as being heritable. By labeling traits as heritable, the bridge between technical 
heritability estimates and folk heritability is constructed. Since no explicit technical defini-
tion of heritable exists, it is inevitable that the term is interpreted using its folk definition. 
The folk definition of heritable is not meaningful in the context of our current understand-
ing of heredity. Such use is confusing at best and leads to widespread misunderstanding 
about the nature of heredity at worst. By refraining from using such shorthand, researchers 
can at least stop confusing those less sophisticated than themselves. 
Another approach to reducing some of the confusion surrounding heritability is to fol-
low the advice of Lush and “coin a new word” (cited in Bell, 1977). Such a word should 
present the idea “precisely and in a way in which it cannot be misunderstood.” This solu-
tion is much more ambitious than the first. However, it has the potential to eliminate the 
confusion between the technical and folk meanings of heritability and also to reflect the 
theoretical underpinnings of the statistic. 
The word “selectability” may prove to be a satisfactory replacement for heritability. Se-
lectability has no folk definition and thus cannot be subject to the same kind of confusion 
promoted by the use of heritability. The Oxford English Dictionary lists no matches for the 
word selectability. Of course, its root select has been a part of the English language for cen-
turies. Of select’s several definitions, the one that most closely matches the intended 
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technical meaning is “To choose or pick out something from a number; to make a selec-
tion.” In fact, Charles Darwin (1859) cites the word in a way that is consistent with the 
intended technical meaning: “In man’s methodical selection, a breeder selects for some 
definite object . . .” (OED2). Thus, in this case, the technical and folk meanings of the word 
are wholly similar and in harmony with Lush’s (1940) intentions for estimating such a sta-
tistic, that is, to provide an estimate of the expected results of artificial selection. 
Admittedly, proposing to replace a term that has been in use for more than 50 years and 
has many proponents will almost assuredly be viewed in a negative light by some. Those 
researchers who routinely calculate heritability estimates for traits in human populations 
will certainly be the most difficult to persuade. To calculate a statistic called a “selectability 
estimate” or to identify a trait in human populations as “selectable” obviously carries bag-
gage of its own, raising the specter of eugenics. Because of this, researchers would need to 
carefully consider the utility of calculating such a statistic, and when it is deemed neces-
sary, careful use of language would be required. To begin to resolve some of the misun-
derstandings surrounding heredity, it is imperative that we come to terms with the 
ambiguity in our language and chart a course that avoids such pitfalls whenever possible. 
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